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LONG-RANGE ALTERNATIVES IN ITALIAN POLITICS
The present precarious balance in the Italian Parliament
renders the establishment of a stable and positive governmental
combination extremely problematical over the short run. In the
Chamber, the Christian Democrats have lost their absolute majority
and now hold 262 of the 590 Chamber seats. The three minor Center
parties -- the Social Democrats (19 seats), the Republicans (5 seate),
and the Liberals (14 seats) -- command a total of 38 seats. On
the Left, the Communists have 143 seats and their Left-wing Socialist
allies have 75. The extreme Right, on the other hand, comprises
69 seats: 40 for the Monarchists and 29 for the Neo-Fascists of
the MS. The remaining 3 seats belong to the SAdtyroler Volkspartei,
a German Catholic party of Bolsano and Trento provinces. A somewhat
more viable situation exists in the Senate, where the Christian
Democrats have 116 out of 237 seats, and the minor Center parties
have 7 seats: 4 for the Social Democrats and 3 for the Liberals.
Here the Communists and Left-wing Socialists have 86 seats (54 Commu-
nists, 28 Soc ists, and 4 bloc candidates), the extreme Right has
25 (16 Monarchists and 9 Neo-Fascists) , and minor groupings have
3 (1 National Democratic Alliance and 2 Sudtyroler Volkspartei).
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*On the surface, the above situation might appear to permit
the formation of several different types of governmental combinations
based on slim but workable majorities. Actually, however, the
heterogeneous complexion of the Christian Democratic Parliamentary
Group makes the adoption of any clear political line very difficult
indeed. A return to the four-party-coalition, with the Liberals,
Republicans and Social Democrats supporting a Demo-Christian-dominated
Cabinet, would probably be impossible unless the Demo-Christians
adopted a more Leftist and less pronouncedly clerical approach
than has been the case in the past. In fact, Giuseppe Saragat,
leader of the Social Democrats, has advocated an "opening to the
Left" -- an invitation to Nenni's Left-wing Socialists to enter the
Cabinet or, in any event, support the government.1 Such a departure
from the spirit and letter of De Gasperi's Centrist approach would
almost certainly be rejected by the conservative wing of Christian
Democracy, which is still a force to be reckoned with despite
recent electoral setbacks in its Southern strongholds.2 On the
other hand, the 20-odd Christian Democratic trade union deputies
and the 70-80 deputies of "Inisiativa Democratica" (led by former
Minister of the Interior Amintore Fanfani, Paolo Emilio Taviani
and Mariano Rumor) could not be expected to underwrite a government
based on a Christian Democratic-Monarchist entente. It was Pella's
open wooing of the Monarchists, in fact, which first alienated
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the minor Cefiter parties and then forced the Fanfani group into
open intra-party opposition, leading to the overthrow of the Pella
Government.
There is, then, no assurance that a stable government can be
formed without new elections and, for that matter, no sure indication
that another election would necessarily produce a more satisfactory
alignment in Parliament. But rather than analyse the possibilities
of the next few months -- a moderately useful task but one which
would involve the large margin of error and the limited validity
for which such efforts at short-run prediction must always allow--
it might be more desirable to trace out the long--range alternatives
which could conceivably emerge from Italy's current political
stalemate. American appraisals of Italian politics often suffer
from a short-term manipulative bias, a tacit assumption that, if
only the next election can be won and a "strong government" formed,
all will be well. This results in the concoction, by American
policy-makers, of a never-ending succession of transparent expedients
designed to win the next election or openly fortify the existing
government against a Parliamentary crisis. The Ill-starred Trieste
declarations of 1948 and 1953; the pre-electoral mixtures of
thinly-veiled threat, exhortation, and cajolery; the continuous
flow of official and unofficial advice -- much of it based on gross
over-simplification of Italian problems, as for instance the Dayton
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bombshell 3 of 1950, our efforts to induce the "laic" democratic
trade unions to fuse with the Catholic CILt and recent suggestions
that offshore procurement contracts be granted only to firms
utilizing American-type loyalty screening procedures: 5 these are
all manifestations of our Italian policy, which might be charactcr 
as a series of spasmodic responses to violent electrical stimuli.
Yet if American foreign policy is to be successful in its aim
of helping to ensure a peaceful and reasonably stable Western
world, progressing both politically and economically toward higher
forms of development, such policy must consider long-term treads
and possibilities as well as the fleeting events of the day. It
must also consider the eventual implications of some of the hasty
experiments we are so quick to advocate. In this paper, I propose
to examine briefly a set of possible future outlets, both democratic
and non-democratic, for Italy's current crisis.
Long-run Alternatives
I. A Return to Fascism
This possibility can probably be ruled out. The Neo-Fascist
Italian Social Movement (HSI) has a fairly limited appeal and
polled only 5.9% of the vote in 1953, losing 100,000 votes from the
record of 1.6 million attained in the administrative elections of
1951-2. Despite its gains In Northern and North-Central Italy,
it is still strongest in the South and Islands, far from the centers
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of political and economic power. Its leadership is rather on the
mediocre side (Do Marsanich and Almirante were minor figures even
under Fascism); and the memory of the Fascist era and of the
German-sponsored Social Republic of 1943-5 is still too fresh in
Italian minds. The M51, like its Fascist predecessor, could rise
to power only through a campaign of systematic violence ainst
other political groupings. But this time the essential Ingredient
which made the March on Rome possible -- police and Army protection
for the Fascist punitive squads6 -- is lacking and is not likely to
be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. Nor is financial support
from Northern industrialists as generous as after World War I.
The pseudo-Socialist program and wild-eyed demeanor of the HSI has
thoroughly frightened many Northern capitalists, who tend to favor
more orthodox Rightist movements like the Monarchists. tarring
a world-wide depression or some similar catastrophic development,
the NSI has virtually no chance of seizing absolute power unless a
Right-Center regime takes the unlikely step of relying on Fascist
strong-arm support, repeating the disastrous experience of 1919-22.
II. A Communist -Italy
This eventuality, though improbable, cannot be entirely excluded:
the Communist Party could rise to power in the future as head of a
Popular Front coalition including the Nenni Socialists, the minor
--
Center parties driven leftward by Right-wing excesses, and possibly
even disgruntled elements from the ranks of Christian Democracy
itself.
An essential precondition for the formation of a Popular Front
would be a sustained effort on the part of a Christian Democratic
or Liberal Premier to appease the extreme Right. Had Pella received
. the support of his party in his policy of rapprochement with the
Monarchists and Neo-Fascists, had his appointment of a Right-wing
Christian Democrat acceptable to the Monarchists to the key post
of Minister of Agriculture been approved in party councils, the
minor Center parties (which are even now thoroughly disillusioned
with Christian Democracy) and the Demo-Christian trade-union elements
led by Pastore and Morelli might eventually have been amenable to
the Popular Front appeal as a defense against the threat of resurgent
Fascism.
Communism has by no means shot its bolt in Italy. Its progress
on June 7 marked the continuation of a steady advance begun in 1945.
Having virtually consolidated its position among the sharecroppers
and farmhands of North-Central Italy and among the workers in the
sheltered large-scale industries of the Milan-Turin-Genoa industrial
triangle, it has, with the help of its Left-wing Socialist ally,
begun to gain at the expense of the Christian Democrats and Social
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Democrats in the Catholic strongholds of North Lombardy and the
Veneto.8 The inability of the Italian economic system to absorb
its new levies as they enter the labor force may be the reason
behind the considerable rise in Communist votes in North Lombard
and Venetian industrial areas where Christian Democratic hegemony
was previously all but unchallenged. And the awakening South, whert
the Communist Party has made its most spectacular gains since 1946,
is still a partly untapped reservoir.
To be sure, the Communist Party faces some well-nigh insuperable
obstacles -- the hostility of most of the urban middle class and
land-owning peasantry, the fact that part of the working-class
militates in Catholic and Republican-Socialist trade unions, occasional
displays of rebelliousness or passive resistance by some sections
of its rank and file9 with some resultant losses of votes, and its
dependence on a tenuous alliance with its junior partner and would- a
rival, Nenni's PSI (over 1/3 of the extreme Leftist vote in 1953 wa
polled by the PSI). But the continued existence of chronic unemploy-
ment and under-employment, the threat of further lay-of fs, the
widespread public belief that Italian political life is corrupt
and that tax evasion by the rich in rampant, the hunger for land and
bread in the South and Islands, and the bitter resentment that many
secular Centrists feel in regard to clerical domination of Italy and
Christian Democratic failure to implement certain Constitutional
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normsl 0 -- all these factors work in favor of Italian Communism.
Besides, the Communist Party has an excellent well--financed
organisation, a serious, concrete, outwardly constructive approach
to Italian problems, and a messianic seal matched only by some
elements of Christian Democracy and Catholic Action. But the latter
are hampered by an attitude of cloying paternalism which antagonizes
large sections of the populace, while the Communist Party, through
its intimate cell structure and its constant agitation and discussion
of specific goals and targets gives people the illusory sense of
actually participating in important policy decisions. The disciplined
docility of the Communist electorate (in reality the Socialist
electorate of 1919 rendered ripe for Communism by the blackjacks
and castor oil of the Fascist action squads), the Communist domination
of the trade unions, the bankruptcy of the minor Center parties,
and above all the absence of a strong ably-led democratic Socialist
party give the PCI a quasi-monopoly of the Leftist opposition to
Christian Democracy. The Italian Communist Party will probably be
unable to overcome the obstacles cited above, but it will remain
an ever-present threat to Italian democracy, especially if it. is
able to retain the PSI as its ally.
III. A "Salazar" Solution
This is a perhaps overly picturesque title for the ultimate
non-democratic outcome of a Right-Center coalition government:
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a gradual, more or less violent evolution toward a traditional
and rather flexible authoritarian regime of the Portugese or
Latin American type, with or without one-man rule. Such a government
would be largely Christian Democratic, with the participation or
support of the Monarchists and Right-wing Liberals and with the
support or benevolent neutrality of the Neo-Fascists. At the hela
would be a conse-vative Liberal or Christian Democrat of great
personal prestige and integrity -- a aan like Pella. In fact,
there was some apprehension that such a government might be in the
making under Pella, who seemed to feel a peculiar need to consult
Monarchist and Neo-Fascist leaders on every possible occasion and
to speak at the commemoration of Salandra (an interventionist
Liberal leader of World War I, who symbolizes the Rightist strand
of Italian Liberilism). The inflation of the Trieste question
into an overriding issue, transcending all domestic problems and
giving rise to riots and jingoist demonstrations, so strengthened
Pella's position as to encourage him to seek an understanding with
the Right., However, Pella's own party rebelled against bim when
the Monarchists unveiled one of their conditions -- the appointment
of a Minister of Agriculture hostile to the land reform program,
Salvatore Aldisio.
Americans, who are sometias sadly susceptible to the appeal
of "the strong man above politics", may perhaps labor under some
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delusions as to the character such a regime would perforce assume.
A Right-Center government would have to soft-pedal the land reform
program (anathema to the Monarchists and to many Right-wing Demo-
Christians), shut an eye to tax law violations, and give strident
nationalism a free rein. Dependent as it would be on the most
blindly egotistical business and agrarian classes in Western Europe,
it would have to sponsor a high-tariff, restrictive policy in regard
to foreign trade, while supporting high prices, anti-strike
legislation, and reduced social benefits at home. Moreover, it
would have to appropriate funds for isolated pork-barrel projects
dear to the hearts of Southern deputies, rather than for integrated
programs for Southern development. There would be an increasing
tendency to use the police and the State apparatus (the provincial
Prefects, etc.) :to discourage adverse criticism and "manage"
elections in the best tradition of Southern politics. Finally,
since the Monarchist Party includes many former Fascist hierarchs
(Cantalupo, Acerbo, Delcroix), an alliance with it would be regarded
as tantamount to a vindication of Fascism in its less extreme
aspects -- in other words, a repudiation of. the Italian Resistance.
Such a development would -probably drive the minor democratic
parties into forming a common front with the Nenni Socialists, and
through them, with the Communists. It might also lead to the
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secession from the DC of many Catholic trade-union elements and
be
some of Fanfani's followers. It would/impossible, then, within the
framework of the present Parliamentary line-up, to create a Right-
Center coalition of the sort Pella envisaged, barring an unconditional
capitulation by the DC Left leading to the formation of a Popular.
Front by the Leftist and Centrist opposition. Only a decisive
advance by the extreme Right in new elections, coupled with a
higher ratio of preference votes for conservative Demo-Christian
deputies (on June 7, the trade-union and "Iniziative Democratica"
factions forged ahead while many Catholic conservatives went down
to defeat)12 could render a Right-Center regime feasible: possibly
this result might.be facilitated if the Church and Gedda's Catholic
Action were to throw their weight decisively into the scales on
behalf of conservative candidates. But this would be a Pyrrhic
victory at best, splitting Christian Democracy and dividing the
country into two hostile blocs. Thus, a Right-Center government
would either have to resign or attempt to hold its own through
reliance on Fascist votes in the Parliament and through the use of
accentuated coercive measures in the country at large. If the
latter course were adopted and the government were able to prevail
over the Communist-led opposition, Italy would evolve toward a
modified Salazar-type regime, bolstered by Northern industrial and
agrarian capitalism, the Southern subproletariat and landed classes,
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and the Church. In a modern country like Italy, with its strong
trade-union tradition and relatively well-educated electorate, such
a regime would be a grotesque anachronism which could not fail to
produce eventually a violent and perhaps decisive Leftist reaction.
At any rate, it would be useless to think in terms of economic
and social development under such a system, let alone democratic
development. It is necessary to stress this point rather strongly,
for the American press treatment of the reasons behind Pella's
resignation showed a certain lack of perception as to the ultimate
issues at stake.
IV. Return to the four-party coalition.
After the June 7 elections, and after the arrogance shown by
De Gasperi and especially by Gonella in their attitude toward the
minor Center parties throughout the period of the electoral campaign
and the post-election Cabinet crisis, it would appear that the
days of De Gasperi's Centrist policy are over. The minor parties
feel, and with some justification, that they have sacrificed them-
solves for seven long years in order to maintain a one-sided
partnership which their principal ally has violated almost at will.
In exchange for a few Cabinet posts, they have lost their separate
identities in the eyes of the voters and have suffered a gradual
but inexorable erosion of their electoral base. Moreover, they
have seen the Christian Democrats steadily increase their
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predominance over all sectors of Italian economic lifold take a
rather casual attitude toward the -implementation of Constitutional
safeguards 1 5 and threaten to augment their already impressive
influence in the schools, the press and radio, and the field of
social assistance. 16
While the tactical opportunism of the Center parties --- and
particularly of the Social Democrats -- has permitted the abandonment
of seemingly firm positions in the past}7 it seems quite probable,
as a result of the electoral shock treatment of June 7, that only
a more Leftist orientation on the part of Christian Democracy, and
only a far greater readiness to meet the minor Center parties.
halfway, would permit a reconstitution of the four-party alliance.
Such an alliance would be based on a very slin majority, unless ta
minor parties were able to increase their voting strength substantially
in the future. It might include minor Center party members in the
Cabinet or simply involve minor Center party support for an all
Demo-Christian Cabinet.
Any such alternative, which would probably entail the selection
of a Left-wing Christian Democrat like Giovanni Gronchlis or
Amintore Fanfani as Premier (though even the return of De Gasperi --
a Left-oriented De Gasperi, to be sure -- is conceivable), would
face three serious difficulties. The Demo-Christian Left, though
strongly in favor2 f ocialt reform and possessing many young
advocates of darinrly coistructive solu1tions to national problem ,
remains rather obtise and Insensitive to the civil-liberty exigencies
of the minor Center partiea. Fanfani, heir to Dossetti's "Catholic
integralism", has as Minister of the Interior given no indication
of seeking to repeal the unconstitutional provisions of the penal
code or of showing due t;larance for the rights of Protestant
minority groups. HIe and other leaders of "Iniziativa Democratica"
are suspected by such laic organs as 11 Mondo of thinking along
lines of theocratic pate:alism. 1 9  It must be remembered that it
was the Dossetti group (fron which "Iniziativa Democratica" stems)
wh.ch in 1950 and '.951 proposed jettisoning the minor Center parties
from the Cabinet ard' 2frring an all Deio-Christian government,2
So it is quite pcssible that the aggrersive social pioneering and
Catholic zeal of Fanfani and La Pira2 1 may prove even more obnoxious
to the minor Center parties than the patronage-ridden orthodox
Centrism of De Gasperi and Gonella.
Besides, the minor Center parties suffer from a deep-rooted
inferiority complea due to their 'chronic inability to attract a
substantial segment of the electorate. This inability is attributed
by many of their leaders to the long period of collaboration witb
Christian Democracy , which allegedly laid the minor parties open to
the accusation oi being De Gasperi's satellites. Actually, it was
not the fact Qo ar itself, but rather the servile and
virtually uncondt.ional character which that collab1re tior iesumed
the Center pcrie r constnt internecine bickerirg a r
maneuvering, and their failure to formulate concret, and imll
policy propoals i ather than abstruse ideological p oc
caused the mas of the Itaian electorate to ignore the Third o
3e that as it may , however , the Third Force parties may well feel
that any fuur r-par coliition, aven under Gronchi' 'ess
rigidy Cath :<o, woauld bear the stigma of the piat.
Thus, quiteapr fro, Faaispotent.1ial athtorit arian tendenaces3
the minor C patie grong desire to assert their separate
identities and their increasiugly restive attitude toward Christinr
Democracy coetitute an adtional hindrance. Either Saragat's
"opening to the Left" proposal 2 2-- that the Nenni Socialists be
invited to join the government coalition- or La Halfa's proposal
for a "democratic &lternative"2 3 (a Centrist cartel of the three
laic partis, oppoing both Christian Democracy and Communim) d
involve conditions which many Christian Democrats would be unwilliniL
to countenance. And needless to add, a surrender by the minior
Center parties today would simply postpone the inevitable showdown
with Christian Democracy while enabling the Communists and Renni
Socialists to make further inroads on the Centrist electorate.
I
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The third obstacle to a government led by the Left-wing
Christian Democrats would be the attitude. of the Demo-Christian
and Liberal iRIght winga evnten bitterly opose the land reform
and other social measures and yearn for a Rigat-Center gournmet
More than a hundred deputies of the present DC Group in the Chamber
of Deputies come from Rome and the South; and many of these men are
dependent on local conservative clienteles opposed to social and
political progress. Christian Democracy in the South is often not
far remo*ed from the extreme Right (many parish priests are
Monarchist sympathizers) and has frequently appeared to collaborate
with the Monarchists and Neo-Fascists in Southern municipal and
regional administrations.24 Similarly, many Liberals are advocates
of a coalition with the Monarchist Party. It is an unfortunate
fact that, thanks to the virtual non-existence of the minor Center
parties in most of the South and the low quality of Christian
Democratic leadership there, the more advanced and articulate
sections of the Southern electorate vote for the parties of the
extreme Left, while the Christian Democrats rely largely on the
votes of the more tradition-steeped rural areas such as Campania
and the Southern Puglie--votes which generally express a conservative
mandate. It is quite possible, then, that any future elections would
still produce enough Right-wing Christian Democratic and Liberal
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deputies to render a four-party coalition unfeasible except at
the price of abandoning or indefinitely suspending the present
demands of the minor Center parties for a more progressive and
libertarian policy. But as we have previously pointed out, any
such abject retreat by the Third Force would have an ultimately
aggravating effect on an already inflamed situation.
V. A Socialist Alternative.
Our discussion thus far permits us to arrive at a basic
conclusion: Italy can no longer be governed democratically over
an extended period of time unless some other alternative to the
present impasse can be found. A democratic coalition coposed of
a gigantic Christian Democratic Party -- internally divided on
socio-economic issues and half-hearted in its allegiance to certain
liberties deemed fundamental by its allies -- and three minor
satellites, is a coalition built on sand. A situation of this
nature must sooner or later degenerate in the direction of one or
another extreme. For it has been clearly demonstrated over the
last six years that large sections of Italian political Catholicisam
entertain aims and methods which cannot be entirely reconciled with
political democracy as it is understood in the West.
This poses the central issue of an effective counterbalance
to Christian Democracy in the Centrist coalition. Only the revival
of a strong democratic socialist party and an esxpansion of the
Liberal movement can provide the necessary impetus to make the
Third Force a respected protagonist on the Italian scene. The
second of these two requirements is of a rather secondary charac-
ter, since the Liberals can only hope to expand at the expense of
the Christian Democrats and the extreme Right, and such accretions
might merely cause the PLI to revert to its ultra-conservative
position of 1948. The PLI is already severly split between the
able, progressive-minded Left (typified by the 11 Nondo group)
and the reactionary Right. 2 5 While further expansion of the PLI
might mark the beginning of the decline of the Monarchist Party
and a trend toward a more wholesome variety of conservatism in the
Rightist camp, it would not of itself provide an answer to the
crucial problem of Italian politics.
That problem may be summed up as the capture by the runist
Party and the PSI of the loyalties and hopes of the bulk of the
industrial working class and rural proletariat. Over nine and a
half million Italian voters cast their ballots for the two mass
parties of the extreme Left in the elections of June 7. As long
as 35-40% of the Italian electorate in virtually outside the political
game, so long must the forces of secular democracy stand weak and
isolated against a mass Catholic party and the ever-threatening
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presence of the extreme Right, operating through two Rightist
parties and through Rightist fellow-travellers in the DC and PLI.
It was on the basis of this Insight that Saragat -- after the
Social Democrats had lost about 1/3 of their strength in the June 7
elections -- proposed inviting Nenni to enter the government. Such
an invitation, Saragat declared, would call Nonni's bluff and test
the validity of his pre-election references to a "Bocialist
alternative" and his purported willingness to accept the Atlantic
in return
Pact/tor a more independent Italian foreign policy within NATO. A
refusal on Nenni 's part to bear his -share of government responsibility
would, according to Saragat, reveal the spuriousness of his
protestations of autonomy and might lead to wholesale desertions
by disgruntled Socialistaho "uld be finally convinced of Nenni's
sUbsetvience to the Communist line. 2
Now, in discussing an overture to Nenni -- assuming it were
approved by the Christian Democrats and other Center parties -- we
must bear in mind the aximalist character of the PSI. In the
maxislist tradition of Italian Socialism, any participation in a
bogirgeois government, even for the -purpose of executing widespread
reform measures, is treason to the revolution. So is any rupture
of working-class unity; that is, in this case; any break with the
C66"AiAts. Those who defy this creed are promptly branded as
traitors to the working clanis And indeed those who have left
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the PSI since 1947 have, almost willy-nilly , followed devious
paths not always based on a consistent set 9f principles. Instructive
in this regard is the experience of a San like Giuseppe Romita:
Socialist Minister of the Interior in 1946, seceded to the Social
Democrats in 1949, seceded from the PgLI to help form the splinter
PSU in 1950 , brought the PSU back into Saragat ' camp in 1951, and
is today a factional leader in the PMDI. Bomita, and other notable
secessionists like Ivan Matteo Lo8bardo, Simonini, and -Saragat
himself , have found that secession from the PSI brought almost
automatic loss of working-class support. And unfortunately, the
incoherent and opportunistic line followed by the Social Demoorats
since 194727 has made it ever easier for the Communists and their
allies in the PSI to discredit would-be critics of the Unity of
Action Pact between the two extreme Leftist parties.
Moreover, the pro-Commnist element in the PSI under the
high-handed leadership of Rodolfo Morandi2 Oreste ,iamadr,9 and
30Giusto Tolloy, has come to control the party machinery and Socialist
trade-union movement to such an extent as to render Nenni's status
as party leader seriously suspect. enni 's oratorical magic may
fascinate the Socialist crowds at party rallies, his editorials
may regularly decorate the first page of the party newspaper Avanti,
but who is to say that a decision by Nenni to break with the
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Communists would not leave him Isolated? The PSI as .a party has
been under the almost absolute domination of the Left wing since
1949, with discussion and criticism all but stifled since the
31
Bologna Congress of 1951. Centrist and autonomist leaders like
Alberto Jacoetti, Riccardo Lombardi, Bruno oa, Giovanni Sapietro,
and Giancarlo Matteotti have either been cowed into acquiescence
or, in Natteotti's case, expelled. It is also to be noted that
Nenni himself no longer speaks in such conciliatory tones in regard
to Italian acceptance of the Atlantic Pact, and that the recent
meeting of the PSI Central Comittee reiterated the policy of
unity of action with the Communists in the strongest possible
tea33
To be sure, Togliatti might -- in pursuit of the Cominform's
current flexible policy -- agree to Nenni's entry into, or support
of, the government, even if the Communist Party were not included
in such an invitation. But an arrangement of this sort, with
Communist participation, or Communist approval of Socialist
participation, in the government, would most likely represent a
more tactical and temporary shift in Communist policy -- designed
to establish a useful beachhead for exploitation at some future
date -- and would not constitute a long-term solution. Nenni
would be collaborating, but only on Communist sufferance as it were.
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The problem of reviving democratic Socialism in Italy would
still remain.
The PDI, on the other hand, Is certainly ill-equipped to
provide the nucleus for a rejuvenated democratic Socialist party.
The maneuverings and factional clashes of the last seven years have
thoroughly demoralised Italian Social Democracy and its leaders,
who have largely ignored concrete social problems and the formulation
of specific reforms, and have preferred to concentrate instead on
ideological hair-splitting and sterile abstract discussions over
whether or not to remain in the Cabinet. Baragat's leadership has
been especially damaging in this connection, givin#"ty councils
and party policies a distressingly vague and metaphysical intonation.
Only a few Social Democratic leaders like Roberto Tremelloni have
seen the need for sane empirical objectives based on quantitative
knowledge and sound analysis of factual data: but these men have
been ignored and lack the forcefulness necessary to put their views
into effect. In general, the PMDI is an urban middle-class party,
with a few isolated and prosperous ;working-class islands in the
Northern cities and in a few bilian agricultural cooperatives
(e.g. Nolinella), with a party organization which is scanty and
inefficient and which in any event comes into play only before
elections, and with programs and leaders that enjoy no real support
among the workers Saragat now wants to win over. Seven years of
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bidding primarily for middle-class support have taken their toll.
Moreover, other Socialist splinter groups -- the Cacohi-Eagnani
Independent Socialist Union and the Parri-Calaandrei Popular
Unity group -- are quite reluctant to come under aragat's domination.
As we can see, either the conversion of the PBI to a democratic
Socialist policy or the renovation of the PDI, with a view to
enlisting the rank and file of the P8I and of various Soctalist
splinter groups, would encounter severe difficulties. Another
attack on the problem of Socialist unification -- the creation of
an entirely new democratic Socialist party - would be faced, as
was the PSU of 1950-5135 with the implacable hostility of vested
interests in the existing parties. Yet each of these three paths
calls for further exploration.
For there is copious raw material for a democratic Socialist
movement of the Western European variety. Not only is there a
very large part of the PSI electorate -- democratically inclined
but held to the Communist alliance by the sentimental myth of
.working-class solidarity and by fear of going the way of Saragat's
secessionists -- but even many Communists in the lower echelons
show occasional yearnings for independence. And while the PODI
as a whole has hindered rather than helped the Socialist cause,
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some of its less notable leaders -- like Treselloni, the trade
unionist Caruagnola, the old-line reformist Mondolfo, the present
PSDI leader in the Chamber Vigorelli -- show occasional sparks of
the spirit needed to rekindle the Bocialist flame of the early
Twentieth Century.
The above possibilities will be further discussed in our coming
paper on Italian and French Socialism. Suffice it here to trae
out briefly the objective requirements for the rebirth of Italian
denocratic Socialism. What is needed, first of all, is an active
organisation operating continuously at the grass roots, maintaining
close contact with the working classes and the landless peasantry,
studying their needs, agitating on their behalf when necessary
in short, an organisation which can compete with the Coamanist and
Catholic machines on their own ground and with many of their own
methods. (In the last elections, incidentally, it was frequently
noted by news analysts that the 98DI was the least energetic of
the Italian political groupings and the most prone to rely on
outworn techniques and slogans.36
Such an improved organisation requires more funds than have
been hitherto available if it is to contend with the lon. st
apparatus and its formidable corps of paid officials. Nsre we
must beware of the simplistic solution. Current rumors of American
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pressure on the Italian Government to out the Communist Party off
from many of its -economic welspring37 provide one illustration
of the rule-of-thumb approach we warned against earlier in this
paper. It is not by turning the PCI into a martyr party that the
problem of Communist financial predominance can be successfully
combatted. Nor are such gifts as the subsidies by Luigi Antonini's
Italo-American Labor Council to Right-wing factions of Social
Democracy a desirable answer: the role played by these subsidies
in corrupting Saragat's party is a byword in Social Democratic.
circles.38 There is no easy way out, then. The funds must be
raised largely in Italy, partly through the adoption of up-to-date
fund-raising techniques (note the PCI's block parties and
neighborhood feasts, campaigns for the sale of Unit&, and other
successful business and entertainment ventures)3 9 partly through
a more close-knit relationship between the party and its electorate:
an enthusiastic, perpetually-mobilised electorate is far more
generous in contributions to the party coffers.
Another requirement is further penetration into the trade
unions. This is an extremely complex question, particularly
since democratic Socialists have thus far adopted no single course.
Some remain in the largest labor confederation -- the Communist-
dominated CGIL -- and try to work from within. Others, like
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Martoni of olinella, militate in the Catholic-dominated CISL.
Still others have formed the avserically-weakest UIL, made up.
of laic democratic elements. Whichever of these courses may
prove to be the wisest, one point must be emphasised: Saragat 's
policy of basing Italian Bocial Democracy on an idealistic appeal
to the middle class has shown itself to be usound. A Socialist
Party in Italy must rely on organised labor, and bence the struggle
in the trade union field L of paramount importance.
Apart from the above tactical considerations, there is an
underlying normative requirement: democratic Socialism must know
what it wants, must have a constructive program based on careful,
quantitative fact-finding, must in short attempt to emulate the quali-
ties which have made Northern European Bocialism what it is today.
Both Saragat, with his philosophical virtuosity, and Nenni, with
his Maximalist sloganeering and destructive demagoguery, have led
Italian Socialism along false paths, although Venan -- a capable
orator, who has recaptured the emotional fervor if not the solid
content of pre-World War I Socialis -m has retained an impressive
popular following. It is the lack of a concrete, well.-documented
40
set of policies which has put the PODI and PSI at such a
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Comnists and Christian Democrats.
For the two latter parties -- the only two modern political
moments in Italian life today -- are ready with a proposed
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solution to every national and local problem, thus giving the
Italian voters an impression of competence and dedication. This
is especially true of the Communists. The transformation of Italian
democratic Socialism into a mass party will therefore entail a far
more systematic approach to Italian social, economic, and
constitutional problems than socialist leaders have displayed
since World War II.
Finally, the prospects of a -powerful democratic Socialist
movement to serve as cornerstone of a democratic coalition depend
to alarge extent on the actions of foreign powers. sudden stop-
gap loans, short-run offshore purchase contracts, and sensational
pronunciamentos by foreign envoys or political leaders can work
no permanent amelioration in the Italian political situation.
Nor is clandestine pressure on the Italian Government to embark on
a perilous "showdown" with the extremes to be recommended. The
need is a twofold one: rigorous non-intervention in Italian domestic
affairs, on the one hand; and on the other, long-range policies
aimed at creating a climate of peace, security, and prosperity in
the Western world -- a climate within which the Italian economy
can expand, reorganise with a minimun of friction and hardship,
and absorb or export the bulk of its unemployed. Only in such an
atmosphere, in which fear of war and fear of unemployment have been
substantially reduced, can democratic Socialism thrive. Crisis
--
and Insecurity breed Communism or Right-wing extremism. And
those who look longingly at the latter alternative should remember
that Italy"s twenty-odd years under Fascist rule succeeded in
transforming the Conmunist fringe movement of 1921 into the
largest Communist electorate in the free world today.
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